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Lest Ye Be Judged

By  Jason Berry, American Zombie

Published   January 20th, 2011    18 Comments

In times of tribulation, Tynia Landry has always turned to her Christian faith to find solace and inspiration. The past four months have proven to be the most trying period of her life. As the acting CTO (Chief Technology Officer) for the Civil District Court at the time of the October computer crash and failed computer backup service which left the New Orleans real estate industry crippled, responsibility for the loss of millions of dollars in transactions seems to have largely been placed on her shoulders. A burden cast upon her by her employers, the judges of the Orleans Parish Civil District Court, as well as the wounded, incensed real estate professionals fighting for their financial life.

In the wake of the crash there was a call for heads to roll. Tynia’s neck was on the block.

Few could understand how the entire index for the mortgage and conveyance records was being housed solely on a single server, and more importantly, how the data on that server was not backed up properly. Being the highest ranking IT (Information Technology) employee for the court, Tynia was immediately deemed guilty in the court of public opinion. Judge Piper Griffin, head of the Civil District Court’s IT committee, initially defended Landry from public ire. Griffin provided guarded explanations for the crisis and even implied that the data backup company, i365, may have been at fault.

Still, Tynia was hearing rumors among fellow employees that many of the judges wanted her gone. She was concerned that the judges were drawing conclusions without actually understanding the facts. On November 8th, she sent a brief memo to Judge Griffin expressing her concerns.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
Upon hearing rumors that her job was in jeopardy, Landry writes a memo to Judge Piper Griffin pleading her case.

Tynia was repeatedly told that her job was secure but on January 4th, two days before the judges were to appear before City Council in a hearing addressing the problems which led to the crash, the axe fell.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
Landry is asked by the judges to resign. The judges cite her unwillingness to work with Haas in providing him with the operations of the IT department. Landry refuses to resign and denies the charges the judges are making. The judges then meet and decide to fire Landry but do not announce that decision to the public.

The judges’ message to the public was clear: Tynia Landry was at fault and she had been excused and replaced by a reportedly more competent IT professional, Peter Haas. Tried and convicted in a private en banc meeting of the judges, Landry was formally sentenced after refusing an offer to resign. Believing she had done nothing to warrant resignation, she told the judges they would have to fire her if they wanted her removed from the position....they promptly obliged.

Termination - Tynia Landry is fired by the Civil Court Judges


On a Wing and a Prayer

Tynia served the IT department of Orleans Parish Civil Court since 1998, over a decade of service in a position which required her and a single assistant to oversee and address the technology needs of more than 300 employees, an estimated 300 computers, 9 servers, multiple printers, Blackberries and any electronic issue which arose in Civil District Court or any of the offices under the Orleans Parish Clerk of Court’s dominion. As her emails reflect, she often turned to prayer and faith in moments when she felt overwhelmed by the responsibilities of her job.

Running a grossly understaffed and underfunded IT department is hard enough under any circumstance but when said department is responsible for many of New Orleans’ most valuable public records, the burden becomes that much greater. Tynia was fully aware of the enormous responsibility she held and particularly aware the servers she administered were the alpha and omega of not just the city’s property records, but the civil court records as well.

Suffice to say, Tynia has offered up a lot of prayers in her tenure.

JOB DESCRIPTION - Landry explains her job duties and office protocol


In reference to Landry’s workload, Chicago-based IT consultant and Microsoft server specialist Michael Dumas said, “If that poor girl was getting 40 to 60 help notices daily, it’s outrageous to think she could run that office properly with a single assistant. It’s not unheard of for a single server administrator to run 9 servers with SQL and Exchange databases but combined with the number of employees she was responsible for, it’s just a recipe for disaster.”

As Landry described it, she spent most of her time “putting out fires”. Up until the October crash, her biggest fire was Hurricane Katrina. In fact, the flood waters of Katrina nearly wiped out the mortgage and conveyance records for good.

A Brush with Armageddon

For twelve years Tynia held her position without a single reprimand or formal complaint. She even weathered Katrina and was able to recover backup data from destroyed servers. With the the help of local real estate professionals, particularly then Latter and Blum president Arthur Sterbcow, New Orleans’ civil court records and the mortgage and conveyance records were up and running in a makeshift office at the convention center within months after the storm.  Sterbcow donated servers to the clerk's office in order to resurrect the mortgage and conveyance records which had been backed up on tape.

As the city slowly arose from the devastation of the levee breaks, Tynia oversaw the migration of her IT infrastructure from its temporary space at the convention center to a permanent home at Civil District Court, with the mortgage and conveyance servers housed across the street at the Amoco building on Poydras Street.

While she managed to get things up and running, the IT infrastructure running the Clerk of Court’s office and the Civil Court was a hodgepodge of antiquated and even donated machines. Even if a comprehensive plan was created to update the court’s IT systems, Tynia was told there was little to no money to execute such a plan.

However, Katrina was a wake up call for all areas of New Orleans’ city government. The storm made everyone reevaluate the previous method of archiving and backing up records - physical and digital.

When the city flooded, most of the books which contained the physical property records for New Orleans were stored in the basement of the Civil Court building. This curious decision was made back in the 60’s during the height of the Cold War when those in charge were more worried about the threat of a nuclear attack than a class four or five hurricane. Amazingly, no one had considered the danger of keeping precious documents in a basement in a city that sits predominantly below sea level.

The flood waters which engulfed nearly 80% of the city did not actually reach Civil District Court but the sewage system in the building backed up and flooded the basement. Attorney Stephen P. Bruno was serving as the Custodian of Notarial Archives at the time of the storm. He describes the herculean effort it took to salvage some 60,000 documents containing the city’s property record history.

Former Custodian of Notarial Archives, Stephen P. Bruno describes rescuing mortgage and conveyance documents after Hurricane Katrina


Thanks to Bruno’s efforts, we dodged this bullet. The physical documents in these books are considered priceless and were luckily recovered, but the index for all the physical documents had been stored solely on computers since the mid 1980’s. If the computer index was lost, there would be no way to navigate the physical documents from that time period to the present.

Computers were destroyed during Katrina but the tape backups proved successful in restoring data after new servers could be acquired. Realizing the danger of storing the only source of backups (the tapes) in a single location, a decision was made by the judges to use an off-site backup company. That company, DPS, served as the primary backup solution for all court documents until August of 2009 when the decision was made by the judges to go with i365.

Landry explains the decision to us i365 as the Civil Court’s IT backup provider



A Crumbling Foundation

By early 2010, Tynia recognized that most of the computers and servers she maintained and administered along with her single assistant, Jerry Fairman, had reached EOL (End of Life). Her concern was great enough to prompt a memo to the head of the Civil Court’s IT committee, Judge Piper Griffin, warning her that trouble may lie ahead.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
Landry sends an email to Judge Piper Griffin, head of the judges IT committee, informing her that she is in dire need of equipment and she is worried about the state of the CDC’s IT infrastructure.

In the city council hearing, Griffin implied that she relied on the consult of her IT CTO (Landry) to suggest equipment purchases and make IT decisions.

Judge Piper Griffin explains her responsibilities as the head of the Civil Court’s IT committee


Griffin failed to mention that Tynia had repeatedly warned her, and by proxy the judges, that the state of the IT infrastructure was in serious trouble. She also failed to mention that Tynia’s request for equipment purchases were repeatedly deferred or denied.

Landry describes her frustration with the judges lack of financial support for her department


Peter Haas, who has no formal college degree in IT, was introduced to the civil court judges by Judge Tiffany Chase. He was originally brought in to the fray in January of 2010 to evaluate the state of the IT system and make suggestions on what was needed to update it. After the evaluation, Haas told Tynia in an email that he hoped the judges would approve the equipment he believed the court needed. Ironically, many of the items on Haas’ requested equipment list had previously been asked for by Tynia.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
Haas acknowledges that Landry is in dire need of additional equipment.

As Landry and Griffin noted, the judges on the IT committee are responsible for making purchasing decisions and hence IT infrastructure decisions, based on the insight and suggestions of Tynia and the approval of the en banc judges. While she pleaded for more staff and better equipment, Tynia was sent a very clear message from her superiors that financial investment in the Civil Courts’ IT infrastructure was simply not a priority for the judges.

Landry says she was told there would be no financial investment in the IT department due to lack of funding


The young lady who was working as the number two person on the IT staff under Tynia, Patrice Dillon, was a badly-needed 3rd hand hired in 2007. While working in the IT department she was also attending the University of New Orleans to acquire her Masters degree in Computer Science. Landry reported in 2009 that Dillon decided to quit her job after an IT committee meeting, during which Judge Madeleine Landrieu told Dillon, “A junior in high school could do your job.”

Dillon voiced her disgust at Landrieu’s comment to Landry, stating she couldn’t work at the court any longer, and subsequently resigned.

In that same meeting, Landrieu also suggested the IT department could simply purchase computers and resources as needed from Office Depot to save costs. Realizing she was about to lose a direly-needed resource in Dillon and face an equipment meltdown, Tynia voiced her frustration to her immediate supervisor, Traci Dias, Judicial Administrator.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
Tynia Landry voices her frustration with the judges lack of understanding of the daily operations of the IT office. She also notes her frustration with lack of funding to run her basic operations.

The judges had clearly put the kibosh on any IT investments Landry requested from 2009 up to the crash. This was probably in large part due to the dramatic decrease in funding to the JEF (Judicial Expense Fund), which ACT 621 created (we will examine this in the next installment of this series).

However, two weeks before the server crash, some of the judges had requested the court furnish them with iPads complete with monthly AT&T wi-fi and 3G plans. Landry tried to discourage this request.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
Frustrated with the request to purchase iPads by the judges, Landry tries to discourage the purchases.

Judge Madeleine Landrieu purchased an iPad and requested the JEF compensate her for the cost. This request was ultimately denied by the en banc judges.

The Gospel - What Happened

While Tynia faced difficult circumstances throughout her tenure at the court, the question still remains, “Was she responsible for the crash?” The following segment will lay out the events and decisions which led up to the event and what happened in its wake.

As previously stated, the decision to use i365 as the remote backup service was made around August of 2009. While Tynia was happy with DPS, she accepted the judges’ decision to move to the new company. From the very beginning of the contract it was understood that i365 would be installing their own software on the 9 servers under Tynia’s purview. She simply gave i365 technicians remote access to each of the servers. i365 technicians configured the servers as needed and installed the company’s eVault application on each one.

During the installation process, i365 technicians encountered a problem with the mortgage and conveyance server, CDC 08.  In order for the server to run the company's eVault software the server needed a Microsoft server update.  The techs tried to install the update remotely but were unsuccessful.

Tynia also made multiple attempts to install the Microsoft Windows update, Service Pack 2 (SP2), on the server which held the mortgage and conveyance records - CDC 08. She even contacted both Dell and Microsoft before being told that CDC 08 was simply too old to accept the update. Meanwhile i365 had bypassed the need for SP2 on that specific server by creating a “workaround” which allowed their software to run successfully on the machine. SP2 was needed in order for the server to communicate properly with a SQL plug-in. SQL (Structured Query Language) is a computer language designed specifically for interaction with computer databases, like the one used to run the mortgage and conveyance records.

With the workaround in place, the i365 installation engineer assigned to Landry, Ben Wisyanski, signed off on the issue on October 20, 2009, with a final reminder that SP2 eventually needed to be installed.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
i365 notes that due to the SP2 issue on CDC08, i365 has created the “workaround” with the OTM plug-in and this is providing successful backups on the computer. Also, Ben Wisyanski, i365 installation engineer informs Landry that his responsibilities are ended but that she can contact him if needed.

After months of tech support phone calls with Dell and Microsoft, Tynia concluded that CDC 08 was simply too old to install SP2. On January 7th, 2010, she informed Deputy Clerk of Court Chelsey Richard Napoleon that the server needed to be replaced.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
Landry informs Chelsea Richard Napoleon, Chief Deputy Clerk of Orleans Parish Civil District Court, that they are in need of a new server for the CDC.

The new server purchase was eventually approved by the Clerk of Court, Dale Atkins, and arrived on Tynia’s desk on June 02, 2010. Upon receiving the server, Tynia informed her supervisor, Traci Dias, that setting the server up to replace CDC 08 would take some time and she was too busy to get the job done in short order. Bringing CDC 08 down would also interrupt services for the real estate professionals who relied on access to the server to conduct business. Swamped with the endless barrage of support tickets coming in from the Civil Court’s employees as well as those in the Mortgage and Conveyance offices, Tynia informed Dias she would like to wait until the Thanksgiving holiday to get the new server into production in order to avoid service interruptions for the court’s clients and distractions from her other job duties.

Meanwhile, CDC 08 and the other 8 servers were successfully backing up nightly to i365’s system.

On June 7, 2010, Tynia received an email from i365 informing her that they have updated their eVault agent (software) and that she should install the newest version on all nine of the Civil Court’s servers.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
This is the notorious email where i365 informs Landry that she should update the eVault Agent (i365 proprietary software application) on her servers. Landry followed the directions and updated the agent. This action is what is reported to have negated the workaround created by i365 to bypass the SP2 issue on CDC08. i365 has claimed that their marketing department sent this email to Landry but it seems to be addressed directly to Tynia and was sent by Janson B. Hoambrecker, Manager, Remote Disaster Recovery Services. Landry has disputed that this email directive was sent as a “general marketing email”.

This email notice was critical. Tynia followed the directions and installed the new update on all the servers, including CDC 08. She described the update process as a simple procedure which took only a few clicks in a “wizard” interface.

Landry describes how and why she updated i365’s software on the CDC’s servers


This update is what caused the i365 backup on CDC 08 to fail. Apparently the update negated the “workaround” which i365 had previously installed on the computer to bypass the SP2/SQL plug issue. i365 has claimed this email was sent to Landry by their marketing department, but the email originated from Janson B. Hoambrecker, Manager, Remote Disaster Recovery Services, listing three of the CDC (Civil District Court) servers and the version of eVault they were running.

Furthermore, upon the update installation, none of the servers were backing up correctly and Tynia had to contact i365 to correct the issue. On September 21, 2010, Landry opened and closed a ticket which stated that i365 had connected remotely to all the servers and corrected the problem. Once again Tynia was not responsible for the i365 software installation on the CDC servers; i365 handled the software installation remotely.

In an eerily foreboding email dated October 4, 2010, Chelsey Richard Napoleon asked Landry how likely it is that CDC 08 will malfunction.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
Chelsea Richard Napoleon inquires if the new server is in production and inquires about the likelihood of a server crash before the new server is operable.

Three weeks later, on October 26th, CDC 08 crashed. Tynia describes the event.

TL describes the crash - Landry recounts the day of the crash


Tynia notes that two amber lights were flashing on the server which typically indicates a drive failure. But it is still not clear if the drives had failed or if the RAID configuration had failed.

A RAID configuration on a server is the process of formatting multiple drives to run as a single unit. In other words, the server’s operating system sees multiple drives in the computer as one and writes data across all five drives instead of concentrating the data on a single drive. This is done in order to preserve data if a single drive fails.

In a RAID 5 configuration, if a single drive fails a new drive can be installed in the server without any data loss. If two drives fail simultaneously, this results in the server going down completely. If the server has not been backed up properly the only way to recover the data from the server is to extract all the drives from the machine and send them to a data recovery company. Even then, there is no guarantee that all the data from the RAID configuration can be recovered.

As Landry describes it, she followed the instructions of Dell’s tech support to recreate the RAID 5 and reinstall the operating system. This action then overwrote the data that was on the drives previous to the crash. Admittedly, Tynia assumed without checking that she had a clean backup of CDC 08 with i365 when she went forward with recreating the RAID and reinstalling the operating system. Although she didn’t receive any notification from i365 that the backups had failed, unfortunately there was no backup from i365 for CDC 08.

The only option left was to see if the overwritten data on the server’s drives could be extracted. Even when information is overwritten or deleted on computer hard drives, it never really disappears so it is possible for data recovery companies to retrieve overwritten and deleted data.

Once the gravity of the situation began to set in Tynia immediately suggested that the drives be sent out to a data recovery service. The first company who received the drives was ADL, who reported back that the overwrite on the drives was simply too extensive to recover the previous data. The decision was then made to send the drives to another data retrieval company, CBL.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
CBL’s report may provide the best clue as to what actually happened to CDC08. Note that there was damage to the RAID configuration, but also there was electrical damage to components within Drive 4. It could be possible that Drive 4 was failing and this caused damage to the RAID configuration. This is a theory and not confirmed.

It is worth noting that CBL did find electrical damage to the components in drive 4. This single drive failure could have corrupted and damaged the RAID configuration in the server. It is still not clear if two drives did in fact fail or if damage to the RAID configuration is what caused CDC 08 to crash. The server was a Dell Poweredge 2850 and was purchased in 2005. Tynia said the machine required a floppy disk to rebuild the RAID array.

Eventually CBL came to the same conclusion as ADL: they could not retrieve the needed data due to the overwrite. At that point i365 made an offer on behalf of their parent company, Seagate, to look at the drives and attempt a recovery.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
i365 informs Landry and parties that their parent company, Seagate, is willing to try and recover data from the drives free of charge.

While the drives from CDC 08 were being shipped all around the country in a seemingly hopeless attempt to recover the mortgage and conveyance records and their index, Landry and the CDC’s software programming company, Not Rocket Science, were desperately searching for any backups which may have existed prior to the crash. Not Rocket Science did have some data but it was deemed unreliable because it was simply used for testing and was not archived for production. Tynia even contacted DPS, the back up company the court had used previous to i365, to see if they had kept any of the courts’ data.

EMAIL TIMELINE:
Desperate to find a recent backup, Landry reaches out to DPS, the company used for backup before the i365 contract took affect. They inform her that all CDC data was purged when their contract ended.

Upon changing services from DPS to i365 back in August of 2009, Landry decided to conduct her own on site back up to preserve the CDC’s data in the event something went wrong with the transition. She had an old server sitting on a shelf and decided to fire it up to see if it was still operable. It booted and Tynia proceeded to back up CDC 08 on the old server....it would later prove to be a godsend.

Landry explains how the index up to 2009 was recovered


We dodged a bullet with Katrina, and while this crisis is bad enough, we dodged an atomic bomb thanks to that backup on the older server. Keep in mind that even though Landry backed up the mortgage and conveyance data on the older server, it wouldn’t boot when she attempted to retrieve it. The drives in that server had to be sent to CBL for data retrieval to extract the records up to the 2009 dates. It was a last ditch effort which luckily worked; had it not, we would have lost the index for millions of records back to 1985. The data re-entry would have taken years, not months.

This reporter was not able to discern how the data retrieved from these hard drives was verified as accurate.

Seagate later reported that they had retrieved data from CDC 08 up to the date of the crash. But on further inspection of the data, it was determined that there were significant gaps of missing records and it was therefore unusable.

Eventually the decision was made to use records Landry had backed up on the older server (Conveyance up to March 2009, Mortgage up to August 2009) and manually re-enter the missing records and index up to the present. In the January 6th City Council hearing the Clerk of Court reported that the company contracted to conduct the data entry, The Windward Group, had successfully restored the records but the process of verifying it’s accuracy would take another four weeks. After verifying the records, the Clerk must legally certify the records before insurance companies and title companies proceed with property transactions.

A Child of Abraham?

Who is at fault?

The easy answer....the convenient answer for the judges, the Clerk of Court, and i365 is the crisis is the fault of an incompetent IT manager. Media resources were quick to point out that Tynia had received her degree from an online school, the University of Phoenix. Charges of nepotism surfaced claiming she was the niece of former Civil Court Judge, Yada Magee.

Landry describes how the blame of the crash was laid on her shoulders


(Landry also noted that she attended the University of Phoenix campus in Metairie for three years to attain her MBA in technology management; she did not take her courses online.)

A young, black, single mother, she made an easy target for a wealthy, mostly white, real estate community calling for blood. The judges and the Clerk, elected officials concerned with public perception, seemed more than willing to offer her up as sacrifice.

i365, a national company who landed a disaster recovery contract with one of the most disaster-prone cities in the country had a lot to lose if they were perceived to be at fault, from potential lawsuits to the damage to their reputation. Once again, Tynia was an easy target.

Who was at fault? Having read the facts, it’s up to the reader to lay blame but certainly Tynia deserves to be heard.

Landry discusses who she thinks was ultimately to blame for the crash and the lost backup


In the next segment we look at Act 621 and the relationship between the Clerk of Court and the Judicial Expense Fund.

* All email databases were obtained via a public records request by Humid Beings.

* Humid Beings contacted the judges of Orleans Parish Civil District Court for comment but they declined to speak with the reporter.

COMMENTS

  •   tml911     +4   Posted 494 days ago 

    I just would like the public to know that I am sorry that this disaster occurred under my watch but it wasn't my fault at all. God bless!

  •   Fleurdelisgal     +3   Posted 493 days ago 

    Ms Landry - here's to your being utterly exonerated and if you want to be back, rehired. Much good fortune and success to you no matter what you opt for.

    There is obviously abundant proof that you alerted them to the overwhelming opportunity for failure and their denying you the funding to get these vital records safely stored is not your fault. Funny (well not really) that the true necessity of the records became a top priority AFTER the ancient equipment gasped its last. :( So much wrong.

  •   Techgirl     -3   This comment is below the viewing threshold. View
  •   Dambala     +2   Posted 493 days ago 

    Because it wasn't a couple of hours, it would have taken a lot more time than that, not to mention the i365 software install and config. She had no reason to believe the backups were not operating and that the data was secure. If you read the article you will also see that the installation would require bringing down the access to the records which were being used on a daily basis per remote access and in the M&G offices. She wanted to wait until Thanksgiving because that would be the most opportune time to conduct the installation in regards to her time and the downtime to the industry.

    Also, it took them two months to o.k. and order the server after she told them it was needed. There was no sense of urgency on the CDC Clerk's office.

  •   Dambala     0   Posted 493 days ago 

    data was not secure...sic

  •   thedaddy264     +2   Posted 493 days ago 

    I'm glad this story has come out and we know what happened in time line,and not just have to beleive what the people in courts have to say.Ms.Landry had asked on many different times for help and other things needed to help keep that place runnin like it should be ran,but was always told no but they wanted some dam Ipad go figure,what is more important?Thanks to the guy who took the time to research and write this story,because all the news station's would'nt do it...

  •   Apple77     +2   Posted 493 days ago 

    Tynia, Gee, I wish I had more time to read this story of yours but I have to play with my fancy iPad and now that you're not around I have to download the Hip Hop music I want all by my lonesome. Not to mention that I am too busy to install my own toner cartridges so I am just out of luck aren't I?

    Sounds like you're getting out from under the bus where those iPad-lovin' Hip Hop jumpin' judges threw you. Prior to that sounded like you were getting used to beating your head against a brick wall.

  •   kalyn288     +3   Posted 491 days ago 

    It's simple what happened here: Judges choose I365 - I365 fails to back up as promised so rather than the judges/i365 admit/accept they made a mistake - they blame the IT director whom the judges hired and promoted. The same IT director, whom, btw they underpay, under-staff her department, and under-mind all of her advice while freely admitting they have no IT knowledge. If you admit you have no IT expertise, why would you disregard your IT director's advice and then blame her when something fails? I just don't get this!

  •   tom504     +1   Posted 490 days ago 

    The lack of proper resources to manage this network due to budget, lack of motivation or any other reason is the primary culprit.
    (1) After the sql could not be backed up they should have reverted back to the original vendor
    (2) Is i365 doing managed backups are just supplying the solution with local resources needing to manage it? No managed backup means not responsible for day to day backups
    (3) a server IT person would not have allowed Dell to tell them to not only use the same drives but break the raid5, create a new raid5 and then format and install the OS. Insanity, those drives should have been pulled and 3 new drives put in.

    Bottom line is this is a great example of critical IT needs not being met, without the right resource in place to be the advocate for the IT department.

  •   Shactus     +2   Posted 490 days ago 

    What I don't get is why the media outlets aren't reporting this. Are they afraid of the judges or do they feel this isn't important. There are so many components to this story that warrant further investigation. Why did the judges want a new contract if they knew nothing about the IT department or how it worked? When are they planning on independently verifying the now re-backed up files for accuracy? Where is all the money go to from these recordation charges (350 minimum x 20,000 property transfers is a big chunk of change). What the fuck were the judges thinking about when they thought they needed IPads w broadband access, certainly not to access the inaccessible property database.

    Classic example of the ruling elite flexing their muscles to protect a city fiefdom. And I'm not hearing a lot either about Gusman wanting to double the size of the Jail. WTF- TP get on this shit.

  •   Dambala     +1   Posted 490 days ago 

    Shactus I'm going to answer most of those questions in the next segment so hold tight. One question I can't answer though...and it 's a very pregnant one:

    "This reporter was not able to discern how the data retrieved from these hard drives was verified as accurate."

    That is a very big deal.

  •   dumbfounded     +1   Posted 489 days ago 

    On a completely unrelated ( to the gist of the article) note: did you mean to say Judge Piper Griffin inferred or did you mean suggested or hinted?

    There are always vultures waiting to profit from any disaster. In this case a local title attorney has asserted himself in the wake of the crash, speaking to the press and rounding the troops of title examiners to publicly back the clerk of court when she evades, disseminates and places blame everywhere but on her own doorstep. But not only this particular attorney and his title company have something to gain from this disaster. The big title insurance company in town is also swooping in, making decisions regarding insuring closings. They have big pockets to mitigate their risk, and this is an opportunity for them to sell more insurance, sign more agents and squeeze out the competition. Doesn't matter if the information they're using to close a deal is completely unreliable. They're betting on the odds of having a profit when all is said and done.
    Oh, but they'll only write your insurance if you use them exclusively.

    Records verification in mortgage and conveyance offices have been a joke for years. No one has taken this seriously. Nothing's been verified since the storm, and even prior to that the verification was laughable. Errors in indexing of names, property etc have occurred here regularly for decades. Cancellations of assignments, but original mortgages left open 'cause no one paid the extra $10.
    It is a very big deal, but it's nothing new.

    Now here's the question I want answered. Is the clerk of court doing anything different to assure the safety of the records from this point on?

  •   Dambala     +1   Posted 489 days ago 

    - On a completely unrelated ( to the gist of the article) note: did you mean to say Judge Piper Griffin inferred or did you mean suggested or hinted?

    You are correct sir/madame. I meant implied. Sorry for grammar and such, we're trying to get better at editing but it's so much work and we're struggling with resources right now as this is our maiden voyage.

  •   dumbfounded     0   Posted 488 days ago 

    While the clerk of court is likely blameless in the server crash, she does - or rather SHOULD, but refuses to - shoulder the blame for not safeguarding the records. That is her job, and only her job. She can't shirk responsibility by feigning ignorance. If she's ignorant of how the records are stored, she is not doing the job she sought.

  •   nolajoe     -2   Posted 485 days ago 

    this is sympathetic poppycock.

    im an enterprise IT worker. if you are responsible for valuable data (underfunded and overworked or not -- thats the status quo), then you DESIGN A DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN. sure ok, thats what they hired i365 for. wrong. they hired them to do the backups. it is up to YOU to test RECOVERY! you should, once a quarter, test that your backups are working and you can recover from them.

    to not do this is to be incompetent.

    this niece-of-a-judge may be a nice lady, but she was incompetent. either her Phoenix degree didnt educate her properly, or she failed to implement what she was taught. in either case, shes done. thats the way it works.

  •   Noladishu     +1   Posted 484 days ago 

    Good writeup.

    Looking forward to part 3...

  •   Dambala     +1   Posted 483 days ago 

    Joe,

    - it is up to YOU to test RECOVERY! you should, once a quarter, test that your backups are working and you can recover from them.

    I think you should read the story more thoroughly, after the updates were installed none of the servers were backing up correctly...none of them. i365 accessed all of the servers remotely and assured her they were now all working properly including CCD 08. Less than 3 months after that, the server crash occurred. i365 was responsible for their software and the backups, I'm not sure what you are suggesting she should have done that she didn't. She was asking for multiple items to upgrade and maintain the IT systems and was told point blank there would be no investment in IT.

    - this niece-of-a-judge may be a nice lady, but she was incompetent.

    Once again, you obviously didn't read the story....she was not Yada Magee's niece. That claim was false.

    You can call it sympathetic poppycock but these are the facts. And I'm not sure what your implication is about her degree or not implementing what she was taught. She was working with what she had....and that clearly wasn't enough.

  •   Dambala     0   Posted 483 days ago 

    - She was working with what she had....and that clearly wasn't enough.

    by that I mean the physical resources the judges had provided her with, I wasn't referring to her education.